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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
SLOVITER, Chief Judge. 
 
 
 Before us is a Petition for Review filed by Mary Lango, 
widow of a deceased coal miner, from the decision of the Benefits 
Review Board (BRB) affirming the denial by the Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) of her claim for survivors' benefits under the Black 
Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901 - 945.  The sole issue before 
us in this case is whether there was substantial evidence to 
support the decision reached by both the BRB and the ALJ that 
Mrs. Lango failed to establish that her husband's pneumoconiosis 
was a contributing cause of his death.  Although we find 
resolution of that issue relatively straightforward, there is a 
procedural aspect of the case which we believe merits comment.  
 
 I. 
 
 
 Mrs. Lango's husband worked for sixteen and a half 
years as a miner and died at the age of 56 on August 9, 1982.  On 
August 18, 1982, Mrs. Lango filed a claim for survivors' benefits 
under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945, which 
was denied on September 29, 1982.  On October 19, 1982, she 
requested a formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, a 
request that the brief for the Respondent Director, Office of 
Workers' Compensation Programs, concedes was timely.  
Nonetheless, after she still had not received a hearing on her 
original claim for almost twelve years, she filed another claim 
for survivors' benefits dated January 21, 1994. 
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 The still-pending 1982 claim was merged with the 1994 
claim, and the ALJ held a hearing on January 19, 1995.  A 
decision was finally issued denying benefits on May 15, 1995, 
which the BRB affirmed.  It is that decision that is before us, 
more than 14 years after the claim was filed.  By the time this 
case is resolved, Mrs. Lango will be 70 years old.   
   The Respondent offers no adequate explanation for this 
unseemly delay.  Its brief merely states that "for reasons which 
are not apparent from the record, DOL [the Department of Labor] 
did not refer the case to the Office of Administrative Law Judges 
for a formal hearing."  Respondent's brief at 3.  In a footnote 
respondent states: "The Director regrets and apologizes for the 
lengthy delay in the adjudication of Mrs. Lango's claim."  Id. at 
n.2.  
  Were this the only case to come to our attention with 
such delay, we would be inclined to attribute it to a rare 
bureaucratic snag.  However, we note that some recent black lung 
cases in this circuit suggest that this dismaying inefficiency is 
not unusual; in fact, the problem appears to be common enough 
that a brief digression is in order.  In Kowalchick v. Director, 
OWCP, 893 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1990), benefits were awarded 
seventeen years after the initial claim was filed.  Fourteen 
years passed in Sulyma v. Director, OWCP, 827 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 
1987), and, as the opinion in that case revealed, Mr. Sulyma was 
74 years old when he finally received benefits.  Ten years passed 
in Gonzales v. Director, OWCP, 869 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1989).  
Nineteen years were required to grant benefits in Kline v. 
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Director, OWCP, 877 F.2d 1175 (3d Cir. 1989).  Almost seventeen 
years elapsed in Keating v. Director, OWCP, 71 F.3d 1118 (3d Cir. 
1995).  As far as we can tell, it appears that many cases 
languish while waiting for an ALJ or the BRB to hear them.  
Although there may have been special circumstances in some of 
these cases that explain the delay, and we have not exhaustively 
examined the records, there is enough basis in the mere 
recitation of the facts to prompt consideration by the relevant 
administrators beyond a mere apology. 
 Delays are especially significant for recipients of 
black lung benefits since most are nearing the end of their 
lives.  Claimants have less time to use the benefits, and they 
often must wait when illness is increasing their expenses but 
while retirement has reduced their income.  Worse, some may die 
before litigation resolves their claims.   
 Chief Judge Posner has expressed similar concerns about 
black lung cases in the Seventh Circuit.  In Amax Coal Co. v. 
Franklin, 957 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992), he remarked,  
As so often in black lung cases, the processing of the 
claim has been protracted scandalously . . . 
 Such delay is not easy to understand.  These 
are not big or complex cases . . . . [T]he 
typical hearing lasts, we are told, no more 
than an hour . . .  The delay in processing 
these claims is especially regrettable 
because most black lung claimants are middle-
aged or elderly and in poor health, and 
therefore quite likely to die before 
receiving benefits if their cases are spun 
out for years.  We hope that Congress will 
consider streamlining the adjudication of 
disability benefits cases (not limited to 
black lung) along the lines suggested by the 
Federal Courts Study Committee.  See the 
Committee's Report (April 2, 1990), at pp. 
55-58. 
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 According to one commentator who cited official reports 
to Congress, the approval rate for applicants for federal black 
lung benefits is exceedingly low.  See Timothy F. Cogan, Is the 
Doctor Hostile? Obstructive Impairments and the Hostility Rule in 
Federal Black Lung Claims, 97 W. Va. L. Rev. 1003, 1004 (1995).  
It may be that the lengthy time required to process a claim is 
partly responsible.  Cogan estimates that on average it takes 
about a decade after an attorney opens a file on a black lung 
case until benefits are paid and the attorney can collect a fee. 
 Thus, the magnitude of the delays is also likely to affect the 
legal representation available to claimants.  Id. at 1004 n.3.  
Hopefully, the publication of our concern will come to the 
attention of authorities who can do something about it. 
 We, of course, are not authorized to require an award 
of benefits based on an inexplicably long delay, and thus turn to 
the merits of the matter before us.  We must decide whether the 
ALJ or the Benefits Review Board committed an error of law.  
Kowalchick v. Director, OWCP, 893 F.2d at 619.  Under the BRB's 
standard of review, the ALJ's factual findings must be supported 
by substantial evidence.  Id.  Therefore, this court must, when 
reviewing factual findings, "independently review the record and 
decide whether the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial 
evidence."  Id. (citations omitted). 
 
 
 II. 
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  Under 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (1982), Mrs. Lango is entitled 
to benefits if her husband's death was "due to pneumoconiosis."  
When a claim is filed on or after January 1, 1982, "death will be 
considered due to pneumoconiosis if any of the following criteria 
is met: . . . (2) where pneumoconiosis was a substantially 
contributing cause or factor leading to the miner's death or 
where the death was caused by complications of pneumoconiosis."  
20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2).  
 In Lukosevicz v. Director, OWCP, 888 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 
1989), this court considered the meaning of the regulatory phrase 
a "substantially contributing cause or factor."   After surveying 
the legislative history of the 1981 Black Lung Benefits 
Amendments, we held that pneumoconiosis is a substantially 
contributing cause whenever it actually hastens a miner's death 
even if a disease unrelated to pneumoconiosis played a role as 
well.  Id. at 1006.  Thus, we concluded that even if 
pneumoconiosis hastened by only a few days a miner's death from 
pancreatic cancer, there was a basis to award benefits.  Our 
interpretation in Lukosevicz has been followed by at least three 
other circuits.  See Brown v. Rock Creek Mining Co., Inc., 996 
F.2d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 1993); Peabody Coal Co. v. Director, 
OWCP, 972 F.2d 178, 183 (7th Cir. 1992); Shuff v. Cedar Coal Co., 
967 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1992). 
  In this case, there appears to be no dispute that Mr. 
Lango's death was caused by lung cancer.  Mrs. Lango notes that 
the ALJ did find that x-ray evidence showed Mr. Lango had 
pneumoconiosis, a finding the Director does not challenge.  The 
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ALJ also found that no evidence rebutted the presumption in 
§718.203(b) that Mr. Lango's pneumoconiosis resulted from his 
sixteen and a half years of coal mine employment.  However, the 
ALJ denied benefits based on his finding that Mrs. Lango did not 
provide "credible and substantial evidence that pneumoconiosis 
contributed to or hastened the miner's death."  App. at 14.     
 The only evidence introduced by the claimant in an 
effort to show that Mr. Lango's pneumoconiosis hastened his death 
was his death certificate, which had been signed by Dr. Anthony 
DiNicola, his treating physician for 25 years, the hospital 
records, and a report written in 1994 by Dr. DiNicola stating 
that in his opinion pneumoconiosis hastened death.  App. at 49.  
Inexplicably, at the 1995 hearing before the ALJ the claimant did 
not proffer any evidence by Dr. DiNicola, who was still available 
to testify about the basis of his opinion. 
 Looking to the three sources of evidence, the death 
certificate, the doctor's report, and the hospital records, we 
note that the death certificate listed lung cancer under the 
heading "immediate cause of death."  App. at 39.  It also listed 
anthracosilicosis, a form of pneumoconiosis according to § 
718.201, as a significant condition contributing to death.  Since 
 Dr. DiNicola signed the death certificate, the ALJ looked to Dr. 
DiNicola's report, even though it was prepared 14 years after Mr. 
Lango's death, to ascertain if there was a reasoned basis for the 
conclusion that pneumoconiosis contributed to Mr. Lango's death
 set forth in the 1982 death certificate and the 1994 
report. 
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 However, in his report, Dr. DiNicola merely opined: 
"[b]ecause of the associated co-worker's [sic] Pneumoconiosis, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, that is, 
Anthracosilicosis, I can state that this entity of Pneumoconiosis 
hastened his death."  App. at 50.  Dr. DiNicola gave no basis for 
this conclusion.  His report merely stated that "I have enclosed 
pertinent records; copies from The Pottsville Hospital and Warne 
Clinic, within this packet."  App. at 49.  Although the records 
do support his diagnoses of anthracosilicosis and lung cancer, 
this is not an issue in dispute.  The difficulty that the ALJ, 
the BRB, and we find is that the hospital records do not 
specifically explain the doctor's conclusion that the miner's 
death was hastened by pneumoconiosis.   
 It is noteworthy that in rejecting the claim because of 
inadequate evidence to show that pneumoconiosis contributed to 
Mr. Lango's death, the ALJ did not rely on the opinion by Dr. 
Samuel Spagnolo, the physician consulted by the OWCP, that 
pneumoconiosis did not hasten Mr. Lango's death.  On the 
contrary, the ALJ rejected Dr. Spagnolo's opinion as inconclusive 
since Dr. Spagnolo did not see any of the positive x-ray evidence 
showing Mr. Lango had pneumoconiosis.  Nonetheless, the burden 
remained on the claimant, and the claimant failed to meet it. 
 Mrs. Lango argues that Dr. DiNicola had at least as 
plausible a basis for his judgment as did the doctor in 
Lukosevicz, whose conclusion as to the contributing nature of 
pneumoconiosis was deemed a sufficient basis to support the award 
of benefits.  As the Director notes, however, the critical 
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difference is that in Lukosevicz the physician who rendered the 
opinion had performed an autopsy, a revealing diagnostic tool 
providing physical evidence to support a medical conclusion.  In 
contrast, neither Dr. DiNicola nor anyone else performed an 
autopsy of Mr. Lango. 
 The mere statement of a conclusion by a physician, 
without any explanation of the basis for that statement, does not 
take the place of the required reasoning.  As the ALJ stated, "An 
assertion which does not explain how the doctor reached the 
opinion expressed or contain his reasoning does not qualify as a 
reasoned medical opinion."  App. at 13.  See Freeman United Coal 
Corp. v. Cooper, 965 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting a 
conclusory statement by doctor that pneumoconiosis contributed to 
the miner's death). 
 It is true, as Mrs. Lango stresses, that Dr. DiNicola 
was the miner's treating physician for many years, and that the 
treating physician's opinion merits consideration.  See Schaaf v. 
Matthews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978).  Although there is 
some question about the extent of reliance to be given a treating 
physician's opinion when there is conflicting evidence, compare 
Brown v. Rock Creek Mining Co., 996 F.2d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(opinions of treating physicians are clearly entitled to greater 
weight than those of non-treating physicians) with Consolidation 
Oil Co. v. OWCP, 54 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 1995) (improper to 
favor opinion of treating physicians over opinions of non-
treating physicians), the ALJ may permissibly require the 
treating physician to provide more than a conclusory statement 
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before finding that pneumoconiosis contributed to the miner's 
death. 
 The claimant emphasizes that the ALJ mistakenly thought 
that hospital records for the week prior to Mr. Lango's death 
were missing, when, in fact, Mr. Lango was not in the hospital 
for that period.  Thus, the claimant hypothesizes that the ALJ's 
mistake about the hospital records affected his assessment of the 
credibility of Dr. DiNicola's report.  However, the ALJ did not 
disregard information in the hospital records that was otherwise 
relevant.  Nothing in those hospital records supplies the link 
that is missing in this case - a nexus between the pneumoconiosis 
and Mr. Lango's death.   
 The BRB recognized the ALJ's mistake but nevertheless  
concluded:  "although claimant contends that the administrative 
law judge erred in stating that the miner's hospital records were 
incomplete, the administrative law judge properly found that the 
hospital records do not indicate the role the miner's lungs 
and/or anthracosilicosis played in the miner's death."  App. at 
6.  Regretfully, we must agree. 
 In evaluating the opinions set forth in a medical 
report, we must examine the validity of the reasoning of the 
opinion.  Director, OWCP v. Siwiec, 894 F.2d 635, 639 (3d Cir. 
1990).  The court in Risher v. Office of Workers' Compensation 
Programs, 940 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir. 1991), stated that a 
factfinder "may disregard a medical opinion that does not 
adequately explain the basis for its conclusion."  See also 
Brazzalle v. Director, OWCP, 803 F.2d 934, 936 (8th Cir. 1986); 
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Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. Crisp, 866 F.2d 179, 185 (6th 
Cir, 1989); Shrader v. Califano, 608 F.2d 114, 118 (4th Cir. 
1979). 
 The Risher court noted that the mere fact that a death 
certificate refers to pneumoconiosis cannot be viewed as a 
reasoned medical finding, particularly if no autopsy has been 
performed.  See Risher, 940 F.2d at 331.  Therefore, on the basis 
of the record in this case and as presented to both the ALJ and 
the BRB, there was no basis upon which we could overturn their 
decisions. 
 We point out that in its brief the Director notes that 
Mrs. Lango can request a modification based on another opinion by 
Dr. DiNicola if he can supply one, meeting the requirements of 
the statutory scheme.  The Director cites in support 33 U.S.C. § 
922, as incorporated by 30 U.S.C. § 932(a), 20 C.F.R. § 725.310 
(permitting DOL to reconsider denial of benefits upon timely 
request by a party) and Keating v. Director, OWCP, 71 F.3d 1118 
(3d Cir. 1995) (construing the grounds upon which a denial of 
benefits can be reconsidered broad enough to include the ultimate 
fact of denial). 
 
 III. 
 
 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will deny the 
petition for review of an order of the Benefits Review Board 
without prejudice to Mrs. Lango's right to take advantage of the 
opportunities noted in the Director's brief. 
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